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D A V I D A. YOCIS 
Freedom and Responsibility: 
Reflections on Chapter II of Veritat is Sp lendor 
When Veritatis Splendor was first published last fall, it was 
immediately recognized as one of the most significant Church 
documents since Vatican II, and as one of the major 
accomplishments of Pope John Paul's pontificate. The originality of 
the Pope's presentation of the moral life and the urgency with 
which he views the moral crisis in contemporary society give this 
encyclical a practical relevance rarely attained by ecclesiastical 
statements. 
And yet, the more I have studied this encyclical, and especially 
its moral methodology — by which I mean its basic approach to 
morality and the fundamental principles of ethics, its concept of 
moral obligation, practical reasoning, and so on — the more I am 
struck by how little here is actually new. The moral methodology 
of Veritatis Splendor is not substantially different from that found 
in the documents of Vatican II. More than a third of the 184 
footnotes in the encyclical refer to the conciliar documents, and 
many of the most striking passages in the encyclical are actually 
quotations from Vatican II. On the basic questions of fundamental 
moral theology, this document does not break new ground as much 
as it points out the middle of a well-traveled road. 
The Pope phrases the basic question of morality which the 
methodology section of the encyclical tries to answer in this way: 
"How can obedience to universal and unchanging moral norms 
respect the uniqueness and individuality of the person and not 
represent a threat to his freedom and dignity?" (§85). In other 
words, the encyclical is seeking a middle ground between two 
extremes; or, perhaps better, it is trying to hold two opposites 
together at the same time. On the one hand, we have a distorted 
notion of human freedom as an end in itself, of individuals free to 
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choose the moral values which they will uphold without reference 
to any objective standards of right and wrong. On the other hand, 
there is a distorted notion of obedience to God's law as blind 
acceptance of God's will more worthy of a flock of mindless sheep 
than of intelligent human beings. 
John Paul seeks a middle course, or perhaps a creative 
synthesis, between freedom without objective right and wrong and 
obedience without respect for the dignity of the human person. He 
does so, not simply for the sake of balance, but mainly because he 
is convinced that human freedom and obedience to God are not 
opposed to each other but in fact need each other. This insight that 
freedom and obedience are in fact two sides of one coin is not 
original to John Paul. It pervades the entire Catholic approach to 
morality, and no one has developed this insight with more clarity 
and consistency than St. Thomas Aquinas. John Paul presents this 
encyclical not as his own personal opinion but as a faithful 
interpretation of the Thomistic and Catholic tradition which teaches 
the profound interrelationship between human nature and divine 
grace, between human reason and divine revelation, between human 
freedom and the law of God. 
Of the two extreme positions to be avoided, the one which 
exalts freedom without a connection to divine wisdom is clearly the 
one which worries the Pope more, for the idea that morality is 
merely a matter of personal choice is rather common today. All the 
troublesome tendencies in moral theology which John Paul 
addresses in this document are in one way or another dependent 
upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the connection of freedom 
and truth. 
The Notre Dame philosopher Alasdair Maclntyre has written 
several influential works in recent years in which he analyzes the 
curious way in which we use moral language in our society today. 
For example, one person will say, "I t is wrong to take innocent life 
directly; therefore abortion is wrong," while another person will 
say "I t is wrong to deny a woman the right to choose an abortion." 
When both sides in this debate use the words "It is wrong," it 
appears that at least they agree on one thing: that there is something 
wrong for everyone, in and of itself regardless of what any 
individual may think about it; and that their opponents are mistaken 
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for thinking otherwise. We use words like "right" and 
"obligation" and "duty ," as though we believed that these are 
things that are outside ourselves that make claims upon us. 
But we do not really act as if we considered our moral beliefs 
to be objectively true; we act as though the decision to be "pro-
life" or "pro-choice" is a personal decision that is beyond 
discussion. In our society, morality, like politics and religion, is 
something that one does not discuss in public, for we assume that 
it is based on a private choice. How impolite of the Pope to bring 
up abortion on his trips to the United States, or capital punishment, 
or our responsibility to the poorer nations of the world! But it is 
impolite only when we are operating under the assumption that 
these are private issues and that no one ought to "impose" his or 
her views on such matters on someone else. 
We can find this idea of morality as a personal choice not only 
in the broader society but also inside the Catholic Church. Moral 
theologians themselves occasionally presuppose this kind of 
freedom, as the Pope points out. But other, and better, examples 
can be found close to home. We are all familiar with those 
exercises in which we are given a list of persons, some of whom we 
allow to enter the nuclear war survival shelter and some of whom 
we decide are expendable. Or perhaps we are given a list of values 
like "honesty" and "friendship" and "compassion" and asked to 
rank them from highest to lowest priority. The assumption behind 
all of these exercises is that there is no right answer; they simply 
help us to get in touch with the basic values which we already hold. 
The question of which basic values we ought to hold is assumed to 
be a personal question. 
Of course, our human understanding is limited, and so it is 
possible to agree that there is an objective right and wrong and still 
disagree about what it is. John Paul is extremely confident that, in 
the light of the Gospel, the Church can discern what the practical 
demands of morality are with certainty; in fact, he is much more 
confident than I am about this. But before we can discuss what 
morality actually requires of us, we must first recognize, in practice 
as well as in theory, that moral obligation is not something we 
choose but something which happens to us. 
Morality is a matter of responsibility, literally: the ability to 
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respond to an obligation. And ultimately, the one to whom we are 
responding when we act morally is God, who made us in the divine 
image and likeness. Unlike the rest of creation, which has no choice 
but to follow the laws of nature, we human beings have been given 
the ability freely to choose to love God and to love our neighbor. 
God created us so that we could be like God by making a free 
choice to love. John Paul cites Vatican II quoting the Scripture: 
"God willed to leave man in the power of his own counsel, so that 
he would seek his Creator of his own accord" (§38 et al). 
Therefore the freedom from external pressure and force is only 
a means to an end. We have been created with freedom to choose 
the morally good, to choose to love, to choose God, to choose to 
avoid those actions which are incompatible with the love of God 
(the so-called "intrinsically evil" acts). To use our freedom in any 
other way leaves us hollow. We must be left free from external 
constraints precisely so we can respond to the voice of God which 
commands us from within. There is no freedom without the 
obligation to be morally good, without the responsibility to use that 
freedom rightly. 
But — and this needs also to be stressed — there is no 
responsibility without freedom. God does not desire our blind 
obedience but our free obedience, for God created us as human 
beings with intelligence and free will. When we act in a morally 
right way, St. Thomas says, we are more like God (who chooses 
freely to love), and we are more fully human. We are both more 
subject to God's will and more free, more self-possessed when we 
make right moral decisions. This is why no human authority can 
compel conscience, and why the freedom of religion is, as John 
Paul says, "the foundation of the cumulative rights of the person" 
(§31). We are truly free when we submit to the truth of our being, 
but we can only make that submission if we are truly free. 
Thus Veritatis Splendor is not, as some of its detractors 
maintain, a papal attempt to "lay down the law" or to take away 
the freedom of conscience of Catholics. By recalling the intrinsic 
connection between freedom and truth, and by pointing out how this 
connection has been obscured today by society and even within the 
Church, John Paul intends to call both Church and society to the 
really authentic freedom which seeks to know what is true and to 
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do it. For, as Jesus says, "you shall know the truth, and the truth 
shall set you free." 
Thus, when John Paul quotes St. Augustine as saying, "In the 
house of the Lord, slavery is free" (§87), he is not engaging in 
doublespeak but is expressing a paradox which is at the heart of 
Christian faith. One can look to Mary, the model of Christian 
discipleship, who by her "Yes" to God both affirmed her status as 
a servant of God ( " I am the handmaid of the Lord") and at the 
same time fully expressed what human freedom can be. One can 
look to the martyrs, who followed Christ crucified in holding fast 
to the truth even to the point of death, and thus bore witness to the 
strength of human freedom and of God's grace. 
C.S. Lewis once remarked that the saints are all unique 
individuals, while the tyrants and mass murderers of history are all 
depressingly the same. This is a consistent element of the Catholic 
vision of our relationship to God, which says that human freedom 
and growth is not in opposition to obedience to God and to the 
moral law, but that the two in fact presuppose one another. This is 
the heart of the vision of morality which Pope John Paul is asking 
the Church to live in our present age. 
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